English | 学校主页
 首 页  学院概况  研究团队  学术研究  交流合作  科研资源  人才引进 
当前位置: 首 页>>学术研究>>工作论文>>正文
 

刘泽轩

2017-05-23 15:00  点击:[]

1Title When horizontal merger meets vertical integration? Evidence from the Airline Industry  

 

 

Abstract: We explore the impact of horizontal merger on vertically integrated market's price.In U.S. airline industry, regional carriers cooperate with major carriers intensively either by contract or wholly owned by major carriers. Recently, the horizontal\merger wave" fundamentally reshaped the market structure of airline industry.Using the horizontal merger between American Airline and US Airways, we show the anticompetitive force dominates the eciency gain and result in a significant ticket price increase for the merging carrier's vertically integrated partners. In addition, the estimation results indicate the impact is positively related to market concentration and also positively related to how close major carriers are bounded with their regional partners.  

 

 

2Title An Application of Genetic Matching to the US Airlines Merger  

 

 

Abstract: This study estimates the impacts of the merger between US Airways and America West in 2005 on both vertical and horizontal measures of product differentiation. Applying the genetic matching algorithm, we construct a counterfactual group similar to US Airways and America West and then use the diff-in-diff method to identify the merger impacts. On vertical differentiation measures, our results show that the merger reduces arrival delay by about 1.3 minutes, and increases about 13 ights per route. On the other hand, the merging airlines reduce 23% of their routes and y to about 2 fewer destinations per route. For horizontal differentiation measures, we find that the merger reduces the gaps (in minutes) between flights, and does not have any significant impacts on other horizontal differentiation measures. To summarize, this is the first study to address the self-selection of a merger between two airlines by implementing the genetic matching method. Therefore, our results are statistically robust compared to the standard differences-in-differences method, which is generally used in the existing literature to estimate merger impacts.  

 

 

3Title Regulation, Competition, and Price Dispersion: Evidence from the Airline Industry  

 

 

Abstract: We investigate the impact of the government regulation (i.e., slot control policy) on price dispersion. Using carrier-route observations from 2006-2011 at Newark Liberty International Airport, we find that the government's attempt to reduce airport congestion results in an increase of price dispersion by 2%. The vertical differentiation channel is the primary mechanism through which the airlines are able to charge different prices to consumers who are willing to pay extra for high quality flights. Our findings also indicate that competition is no longer an exogenous determinant of price dispersion when there is a change in the regulation. Due to the concerns of policy endogeneity, we apply a semi-parametric difference-in-differences  

model. Moreover, heterogeneity in parameters are apparent as monopolistic flights have the highest price dispersion.  

 

 

4Title Regulation, Competition, and Price Dispersion: Evidence from the Airline Industry  

 

 

Abstract: This project studies the relationship between product quality uncertainty and competition pattern. We consider a specific setting: the product quality has an inevitable quality uncertainty to the consumer but consumers have full information on the players in the market. Sellers compete on price, product quality and location simultaneously. The question we are interested in is when consumers have full information on seller but have uncertainty on specific products, whether sellers are going to engage in more intensive price competition or will compete more intensively on horizontal differentiation (location). We test our theoretical model in the airline industry and find the quality uncertainty increases horizontal differentiation measured by Gini coefficient.  

  • 附件【Abstract-1.pdf】已下载
  • 附件【Abstract-4.pdf】已下载
  • 附件【Abstract-2.pdf】已下载
  • 附件【Abstract-3.pdf】已下载

上一条:江 豆 下一条:舒 蕾

关闭

网站地图 | 友情链接

国际经济管理研究院版权所有
天津市河西区珠江道25号天津财经大学(300222) 电话:022-88157245 邮箱:iabe@tjufe.edu.cn